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Wolfgang	 Obergassel,	 Lauri	 Peterson,	 Florian	 Mersmann,	 Jeanette	 Schade,	 Jane	 Alice	
Hofbauer,	Monika	Mayrhofer	
	
This	article	analyses	human	rights	implications	of	projects	under	the	Clean	Development	
Mechanism	(CDM)	of	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	
(UNFCCC).	While	the	CDM	is	likely	to	expire	in	the	near	future,	the	experience	gained	should	
be	used	to	inform	the	rules	of	the	new	mechanism	to	be	established	under	the	2015	Paris	
Agreement.	We	argue	that	the	CDM	and	the	new	mechanism,	as	international	organisations	
under	the	guidance	of	UNFCCC	member	states,	should	apply	the	UN	Guiding	Principles	on	
Business	and	Human	Rights.	Based	on	the	experience	drawn	from	three	case	studies	(two	
hydro	power	projects	in	Barro	Blanco,	Panama,	and	Bujagali,	Uganda,	and	one	geothermal	
energy	project	in	Olkaria,	Kenya),	we	show	that	CDM	projects,	while	in	formal	compliance	
with	CDM	rules,	can	lead	to	a	number	of	human	rights	infringements.	We	conclude	with	a	
number	of	recommendations	on	how	to	achieve	a	greater	recognition	of	human	rights	in	the	
new	mechanism	under	the	Paris	Agreement.		
Keywords:	Climate	policy,	human	rights,	Clean	Development	Mechanism,	involuntary	
resettlement	
	
	
	 	2	
1	INTRODUCTION		
Mitigation	of	climate	change	requires	large-scale	investments	in	a	range	of	projects	in	the	
near	future,	which—as	is	the	case	with	all	large-scale	projects—have	a	high	potential	to	
infringe	human	rights.1	The	preamble	of	the	2015	Paris	Agreement	acknowledges	that	
‘Parties	should,	when	taking	action	to	address	climate	change,	respect,	promote	and	
consider	their	respective	obligations	on	human	rights,	the	right	to	health,	the	rights	of	
indigenous	peoples,	local	communities,	migrants,	children,	persons	with	disabilities	and	
people	in	vulnerable	situations	and	the	right	to	development,	as	well	as	gender	equality,	
empowerment	of	women	and	intergenerational	equity’.2	
	 Human	rights	implications	of	international	climate	policy	are	not,	though,	only	a	
matter	for	those	states	acting	as	hosts	to	concrete	actions.	In	particular,	climate-related	
actions	in	developing	countries	usually	involve	inter-	and	transnational	(non-state)	actors	
such	as	bilateral	and	multilateral	development	agencies	and	banks	as	well	as	private	project	
implementers—a	convergence	of	actors	raising	the	question	of	extraterritorial	human	rights	
responsibilities.3		
	 This	paper	analyses	one	international	climate	mechanism,	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	Clean	
Development	Mechanism	(CDM),	from	a	human	rights	perspective.	The	CDM	was	chosen	
because	it	is	so	far	the	largest	international	mitigation	policy	instrument	for	developing	
countries,	and	has	about	7,700	registered	projects.4	Moreover,	accusations	of	human	rights	
violations	such	as	forcible	evictions	have	accompanied	the	mechanism	from	the	beginning,5	
making	it	a	particularly	salient	focus	for	a	human	rights	analysis.	
	 The	CDM	is	likely	to	expire	together	with	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	second	commitment	
period,	which	ends	in	2020.	However,	the	2015	Paris	Agreement	establishes	a	new	
‘mechanism	to	contribute	to	the	mitigation	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	support	
sustainable	development’.6	The	decision	by	the	Parties	to	the	UNFCCC	to	adopt	the	Paris	
Agreement	specifies	that	the	rules	for	this	mechanism	are	to	be	developed	on	the	basis	of,	
inter	alia,	‘[e]xperience	gained	with	and	lessons	learned	from	existing	mechanisms’.7	
Therefore,	despite	the	fact	that	the	CDM	has	only	a	limited	lifetime	left,	an	analysis	of	the	
mechanism	can	provide	worthwhile	input	to	the	development	of	new	mechanisms.	
	 The	present	article	first	outlines	relevant	human	rights	norms	and	discusses	
obligations	of	state	and	non-state	actors	in	extraterritorial	activities.	Next,	the	article	
analyses	the	extent	to	which	extent	human	rights	norms	are	considered	by	the	CDM’s	rules.	
																																																						
1	UNHRC,	‘Report	of	the	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	on	the	Relationship	
between	Climate	Change	and	Human	Rights’	(2009)	A/HRC/10/61,	
22ff.<http://www.refworld.org/docid/498811532.html>	accessed	15	May	2015.	
2	United	Nations,	Paris	Agreement,	Preamble‘,	(United	Nations	2015)	
3	Extraterritorial	responsibilities	here	are	meant	as	those	responsibilities	of	(non-state)	actors	that	arise	from	
activities	outside	the	direct	jurisdiction	of	their	parent	state	(see	also	section	2.2	of	this	paper).	
4	UNFCCC,	'CDM:	CDM-Home'	(cdm.unfccc.int,	2016)	<http://cdm.unfccc.int>	accessed	7	November	2016.	
5	See	e.g.	Heidi	Bachram,	'Climate	Fraud	and	Carbon	Colonialism:	The	New	Trade	in	Greenhouse	Gases’	(2004)	
15	Capitalism	Nature	Socialism;	Larry	Lohmann,	Carbon	Trading:	A	Critical	Conversation	on	Climate	Change,	
Privatization	and	Power	(Dag	Hammarskjöld	Foundation,	Uppsala	2006).	
6	United	Nations	2015	(n.	2),	Art.	6.4.	
7	UNFCCC,	‘Decision	1/CP.21,	Adoption	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1,	29	January	2016,	para	
38‘,	(UNFCCC	2015)	
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The	article	then	examines	three	CDM	projects,	the	Barro	Blanco	hydropower	project	in	
Panama,	the	Bujagali	hydropower	project	in	Uganda	and	the	Olkaria	geothermal	project	in	
Kenya.	These	three	cases	were	selected	because	they	involve	international	actors	and	have	
recurrently	been	the	subject	of	media	reports	concerning	human	rights	allegations	in	the	
context	of	associated	resettlement	measures.	As	such,	they	provide	useful	sites	for	a	detailed	
discussion	of	extraterritorial	obligations.		
	 The	research	approach	applied	in	each	case	was	a	human	rights	impact	assessment	
consisting	of	desk	and	field	research,	including	interviews	with	key	stakeholders	and	focus	
group	discussions.	The	three	cases	were	first	extensively	researched	for	written	evidence	in	a	
desk-top	research	exercise.	The	findings	from	this	stage	then	fed	into	a	preliminary	report	
that	hypothesized	possible	infringements	of	human	rights.	The	team	then	conducted	field	
missions	to	each	case	study	site,	and	conducted	interviews	and	focus	group	discussions	with	
a	large	number	of	different	stakeholders.	The	interviewees	included	individuals	directly	
affected	by	the	projects,	project	developers,	government	officials	involved	in	project	
approval	and	development,	non-governmental	organisations,	and	representatives	of	the	bi-	
and	multilateral	donor	organisations	and	banks	involved	in	project	finance.	Finally,	the	article	
discusses	procedural	steps	and	institutional	settings	useful	for	the	prevention	of	future	
human	rights	problems	in	future	projects.	
2.	HUMAN	RIGHTS	AND	EXTRATERRITORIAL	OBLIGATIONS:	LARGE-SCALE	INVESTMENT,	
HUMAN	RIGHTS	NORMS	AND	STATE	OBLIGATIONS		
Large-scale	development	investments	very	often	involve	displacement	and	resettlement	of	
local	populations,	with	consequent	impacts	on	their	livelihoods.	According	to	estimates,	
about	15	million	people	are	evicted	worldwide	each	year	as	a	result	of	infrastructure	
programmes	(dams,	urbanization,	roads,	etc.).8	Displacement	and	planned	relocation	
frequently	lead	to	‘interlocking	disadvantages’9	that	limit	people’s	opportunities	to	maintain	
and	improve	their	livelihoods,	undermine	their	assets	and	capabilities	and	increase	the	risks	
they	face.	As	a	consequence,	relocation	frequently	impairs	the	enjoyment	of	substantive	
human	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	housing,	food,	water,	health	and	property,	as	well	as	civil	
and	political	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	self-determination	and	to	participation	in	decision-
making.10	In	order	to	prepare	the	ground	for	the	following	analysis,	the	following	briefly	
outlines	the	most	pertinent	human	rights	affected	in	the	case	studies.	
An	important	human	right	that	protects	local	people	from	arbitrary	evictions	is	the	right	to	
property,	which	makes	expropriations	conditional	upon	demonstrable	public	interest	and	
																																																						
8	Anthony	Oliver-Smith	(ed.),	Development	&	Dispossession:	The	Crisis	of	Forced	Displacement	and	Resettlement	
(School	for	Advanced	Research	Press	2009).	
9	Interlocking	disadvantages	"include	a	variety	of	forms	of	exclusion,		discrimination	and	disempowerment,	
which	in	turn	determine	people’s	ability	to	access	natural	resources,	social	networks,	education,	health	care,	as	
well	as	labour,	commodity	and	financial	markets."	quoted	from	Jeanette	Schade	and	others,	'Climate	Change	
And	Climate	Policy	Induced	Relocations:	A	Challenge	For	Social	Justice'	(International	Organization	for	Migration	
(IOM)	2015),	3,	<https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/policy_brief_series_issue10_0.pdf>	accessed	17	
May	2016	
10	ibid;	Jeanette	Schade	and	Wolfgang	Obergassel,	'Human	Rights	And	The	Clean	Development	Mechanism'	
(2014)	27	Cambridge	Review	of	International	Affairs	717.	
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adequate	compensation	to	those	affected.	The	right	to	property	is	recognized	by	Article	17	
of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	by	all	regional	human	rights	treaties.	
Moreover,	this	right	relates	to	the	question	of	secure	land	ownership	during	controversial	
development	projects,	a	relationship	acknowledged	by	CESCR	General	Comment	No.	7,	
which	notes	that	‘forced	evictions	occur	[also]	in	the	name	of	development’.11	The	right	to	
housing	addresses	this	problem	by	defining	‘legal	security	of	tenure’	to	be	part	of	the	right.12	
	 As	set	out	in	the	UN	Guiding	Principles	on	Internal	Displacement,	Principle	6,	
displacement/evictions	are	allowed	in	certain	circumstances,	but	this	must	be	interpreted	
strictly.	Relocations	are	permissible	if	the	measure	that	necessitates	it	is	justified	by	a	
compelling	and	overriding	public	interest.	Principle	7	of	the	Guiding	Principles	stipulates	that,	
where	displacement	is	found	to	be	unavoidable,	measures	must	be	taken	to	minimize	it	and	
its	negative	consequences.	This	obligation	has	inter	alia	led	to	the	development	of	detailed	
guidelines	by	international	organisations	for	carrying	out	relocations	in	the	course	of	large-
scale	development	projects,	including	prior	environmental	impact	assessments.13	
	 To	safeguard	against	infringement	of	these	substantive	rights	procedural	norms	are	
of	high	relevance.	For	example,	the	Inter-American	Commission	on	Human	Rights	(IACHR)	
regards	access	to	information,	participation	in	decision-making	processes,	and	access	to	legal	
remedies	as	crucial	measures	‘to	support	and	enhance	the	ability	of	individuals	to	safeguard	
and	vindicate	[their]	rights’.14	Other	treaty	bodies	have	reached	similar	judgements.15	
Indigenous	peoples'	right	to	participation	is	protected	by	the	non-binding	UN	Declaration	on	
the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	(UNDRIP)	that	declares	that	‘no	relocations	shall	take	place	
without	the	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	[FPIC]	of	the	indigenous	peoples	involved’.16	
FPIC	has	inter	alia	been	endorsed	by	the	treaty	supervising	bodies	of	the	ICESCR	and	the	
International	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	all	Forms	of	Racial	Discrimination	(CERD).17	
Procedural	norms	are	particularly	important	in	the	context	of	this	article.	As	will	be	argued	
below,	the	limited	implementation	of	these	norms	is	a	core	driver	for	the	human	rights	
infringements	within	the	three	case	studies.	
3.2 Extraterritorial	obligations	and	obligations	of	foreign	business	actors	
Implementing	projects	under	the	CDM	and	other	international	climate	policy	instruments	in	
a	specific	country	involves	the	engagement	of	foreign	actors	such	as	other	states,	
																																																						
11	CESCR,	‘General	Comment	No.	7:	The	Right	to	Adequate	Housing	(Art.11.1):	Forced	Evictions’	(UN	Committee	
on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	1997)	para	7	<http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a70799d.html>	
accessed	27	May	2015.	
12	CESCR,	‘General	Comment	No.	4:	The	Right	to	Adequate	Housing	(Art.	11	(1)	of	the	Covenant)’	(UN	
Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	1991)	Sixth	Session	E/1992/23	para	8	
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html>	accessed	28	May	2015.	
13	Walter	Kälin,	Guiding	Principles	On	Internal	Displacement	(The	American	Society	of	International	Law	2008),	
26;	32;	36-41.	
14	IACHR,	‘Report	on	the	Situation	of	Human	Rights	in	Ecuador’	(1997)	FN34.	
15	John	H	Knox,	‘Climate	Change	and	Human	Rights	Law’	(2009)	50(1)	Virginia	Journal	of	International	Law	198ff	
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1480120>	accessed	28	August	2015.	
16	UN,	‘United	Nations	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples’	(UN	General	Assembly	2007)	
A/RES/61/295	<http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html>	accessed	12	May	2015.	
17	Tara	Ward,	‘The	Right	to	Free,	Prior,	and	Informed	Consent:	Indigenous	Peoples’	Participation	Rights	within	
International	Law’	(2011)	10	Northwestern	Journal	of	International	Human	Rights	54,	65.	
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international	organisations,	and	foreign	companies.	While	at	least	partly	contested,18	the	
basic	standpoint	of	the	present	article	is	that	foreign	states,	and	by	extension	the	institutions	
and	organisations	they	are	members	of,	have	the	obligation	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil	
human	rights	in	business	dealings	outside	their	direct	territorial	(or	in	the	EU's	case	direct	
regulatory)	boundaries.19	Following	the	UN	Guiding	Principles	on	Business	and	Human	Rights	
(the	‘Ruggie	Principles’),	endorsed	by	the	Human	Rights	Council	in	June	2011,	businesses	
based	in	states	that	are	Parties	to	human	rights	treaties	should	in	all	their	business	dealings	
follow	the	rules	set	out	by	those	treaties	as	well.20	
		 The	Ruggie	Principles	state	that	‘At	present	states	are	generally	not	required	under	
international	human	rights	law	to	regulate	the	extraterritorial	activities	of	businesses	
domiciled	in	their	territory	and/or	jurisdiction.	Nor	are	they	generally	prohibited	from	doing	
so,	provided	there	is	a	recognized	jurisdictional	basis’.21	The	Ruggie	Principles	further	
stipulate	that	states	should	clearly	set	out	the	expectation	that	all	business	enterprises	
domiciled	in	their	jurisdiction	or	territory	must	respect	human	rights;	and	put	forward	
‘strong	policy	reasons’	to	regulate	business	activities	abroad,	particularly	if	the	state	is	
involved	with	or	supports	corporations	operating	abroad,	e.g.	through	lending	policies.22	
		 The	Ruggie	Principles	also	confirm	that	states	‘retain	their	international	human	rights	
law	obligations	when	they	participate	in	[multilateral]	institutions’:	states	should	seek	to	
ensure	that	multilateral	organisations	do	not	restrain	their	members	from	respecting	human	
rights;	and	should	help	other	states	to	meet	their	duty	to	respect	human	rights.23		
	 In	relation	to	businesses,	a	particularly	important	aspect	for	the	present	article	is	
enshrined	in	principle	17:	‘In	order	to	identify,	prevent	and	mitigate	adverse	human	rights	
impacts,	and	to	account	for	their	performance,	business	enterprises	should	carry	out	human	
rights	due	diligence.	The	process	should	include	assessing	actual	and	potential	human	rights	
impacts,	integrating	and	acting	upon	the	findings,	and	tracking	as	well	as	communicating	
their	performance’.24	Principle	17	thus	calls	on	businesses	to	generally	conduct	Human	Rights	
Impact	Assessments	as	part	of	their	due	diligence	processes.	
	 In	summary,	following	the	Ruggie	Principles,	since	businesses	are	subject	to	national	
regulations	in	the	countries	they	are	based	in,	these	countries	need	to	ensure	that	human	
rights	obligations	are	upheld	in	the	dealings	of	those	businesses	both	nationally	and	abroad.	
																																																						
18	ICCPR	§(2)(1)	sets	out	that	the	duty	of	a	state	to	respect	and	ensure	the	rights	recognized	by	the	covenant	is	
confined	to	"all	individuals	within	its	territory	and	subject	to	its	jurisdiction".		
The	ICESCR	contains	no	such	paragraph	limiting	its	jurisdiction.	Instead,	ICESCR	Art.	2(1)	states	that	each	party	
to	the	Covenant	undertakes	steps	‘individually	and	through	international	assistance	and	co-operation	[…]	with	
the	view	to	achieving	progressively	the	full	realization	of	the	rights	recognized	by	the	covenant	[…]	including	
particularly	the	adoption	of	legislative	measures’.		
19	OHCHR,	‘Report	of	the	Special	Representative	of	the	Secretary-	General	on	the	Issue	of	Human	Rights	and	
Transnational	Corporations	and	Other	Business	Enterprises’	(Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	
2011)	A/HRC/17/31	7.	General	Principles.	
20	ibid.	
21	ibid,	Commentary	to	Principle	2.	
22	ibid	7,	"The	reasons	include	ensuring	predictability	for	business	enterprises	by	providing	coherent	and	
consistent	messages,	and	preserving	the	State’s	own	reputation.".	
23	ibid,	Commentary	to	Principle	10.	
24	ibid,	Principle	17.		
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Also,	as	states	are	the	principals	and	constituents	of	international	organisations,	it	is	within	
their	responsibility	to	ensure	that	international	organisations	respect	uphold	human	rights	in	
their	work.	
3	THE	CLEAN	DEVELOPMENT	MECHANISM	AND	HUMAN	RIGHTS		
3.1	Standards	of	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	
The	aim	of	the	CDM	is	defined	in	Article	12	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol:	to	assist	developing	
countries	in	achieving	sustainable	development	and	to	assist	industrialized	countries	in	
achieving	compliance	with	the	emission	reduction	commitments	they	adopted	in	the	
Protocol.	The	CDM	issues	Certified	Emission	Reductions	(CERs)	once	a	project	has	completed	
a	pre-determined	project	cycle.	Industrialized	countries	can	count	these	CERs	towards	their	
Kyoto	commitments.	These	countries	may	either	be	directly	involved	in	the	projects	or,	the	
usual	model,	simply	purchase	the	CERs	from	private	project	operators.25	
	 The	Marrakesh	Accords	(MA)26	establish	the	detailed	‘modalities	and	procedures’	for	
the	implementation	of	a	CDM	project.27	The	CDM	is	supervised	by	an	Executive	Board	(the	
‘Board’)	and	serviced	by	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat.	If	project	participants	wish	to	propose	a	
project	for	the	CDM,	they	need	to	prepare	a	Project	Design	Document	(PDD)	according	to	a	
template	and	regulations	established	by	the	Board.	The	PDD	must	be	examined	by	a	
Designated	Operational	Entity	(DOE)—a	CDM-accredited	independent	certification	company.	
The	project	also	needs	to	be	approved	by	the	host	country	(where	the	project	takes	place)	
through	its	Designated	National	Authority	(DNA)	and—once	CERs	are	to	be	sold—the	
countries	importing	the	CERs.	To	be	issued	CERs,	achieved	reductions	need	to	be	monitored	
by	the	project	participants	and	verified	by	another	DOE.	
	 While	the	CDM's	modalities	and	procedures	do	not	mention	human	rights,	they	
require	project	participants	to	report	on	and	to	account	for	stakeholder	comments	and	to	
report	on	the	project’s	contribution	to	sustainable	development.	However,	there	are	no	
internationally	agreed	CDM	criteria	for	sustainable	development,	nor	rules	for	how	to	
conduct	local	stakeholder	consultations.	Developing	countries	rejected	proposals	for	such	
standards	and	procedures	as	incompatible	with	their	national	sovereignty.28	
	 It	is	therefore	up	to	host	countries	to	define	sustainable	development	criteria	and	
procedures	for	local	stakeholder	consultations.	Research	has	concluded	that	most	host	
countries	have	rather	general	lists	of	non-binding	guidelines	instead	of	clear	criteria	and	do	
not	thoroughly	investigate	projects.	Stakeholder	consultations	are	often	deficient.29	Many	
																																																						
25	Wolfgang	Sterk	and	Christof	Arens,	'Investing	In	Climate	Protection.	Project-Based	Mechanisms	CDM	And	JI'	
(Federal	Ministry	of	the	Environment,	Nature	Conservation	and	Nuclear	Safety	(BMU)	2010).	
26	The	Marrakesh	Accords	contain	detailed	implementation	rules	for	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	particularly	regarding	
emissions	accounting	and	the	functioning	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	flexible	mechanisms.	
27	Decision	3/CMP.1,	FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1	of	30	March	2006.	
28	Farhana	Yamin	and	Joanna	Depledge,	The	International	Climate	Change	Regime:	A	Guide	to	Rules,	Institutions	
and	Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2004).	
29	Emily	Boyd	and	others,	‘Reforming	the	CDM	for	sustainable	development:	lessons	learned	and	policy	futures’	
(2009)	12	Environmental	Science	&	Policy	820;	Karen	Holm	Olsen,	‘The	Clean	Development	Mechanism’s	
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countries	are	thus	seen	as	practicing	market-enabling	governance,	rather	than	governance	of	
the	carbon	market,	with	national	authorities	acting	more	like	business	developers	than	
watch	dogs.30			
	 Furthermore,	all	these	processes	take	place	before	project	implementation.	The	CDM	
rules	contain	no	mechanisms	for	addressing	problems	that	may	not	have	been	visible	in	the	
project	design	and	approval	phase.	There	also	is	no	possibility	to	appeal	Board	decisions.	The	
UNFCCC	has	been	discussing	the	establishment	of	an	appeals	procedure,	but	the	most	recent	
draft	decision	text	dates	from	December	2012	and	has	been	pushed	forward	without	further	
changes	from	meeting	to	meeting	ever	since.	Controversial	issues	include	the	question	of	
who	would	be	allowed	to	appeal	Board	decisions	and	whether	the	right	of	appeal	would	
cover	project	rejections	only,	or	also	cover	approvals,	and	if	so,	on	what	grounds.31	
	 Criticism	of	the	lack	of	safeguards	in	the	CDM	has	frequently	been	on	the	Board’s	
agenda.	Moreover,	in	2011,	the	Board	convened	a	High-Level	Panel	to	conduct	a	CDM	Policy	
Dialogue	to	identify	avenues	for	improving	the	mechanism.	The	High-Level	Panel	
recommended	a	list	of	actions	to	help	ensure	that	CDM	projects	help	achieve	sustainable	
development.	These	actions	include	better	assessment	of	projects;	reporting,	monitoring	
and	verification	of	impacts	throughout	the	lifetime	of	a	project;	enabling	de-registration	of	
projects	with	negative	impacts;	and	establishing	guidelines	for	local	stakeholder	
consultations.32	Nonetheless,	members	from	developing	countries	in	particular	repeatedly	
rejected	such	suggestions	to	strengthen	rules	as	being	incompatible	with	host	countries'	
national	sovereignty.33		
	 In	2015,	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat	produced	a	concept	note	on	how	to	improve	
stakeholder	consultations.	The	concept	note	recommended	defining		
• the	scope	of	local	stakeholder	consultations	as	comprising	both	positive	and	negative	
impacts,		
• the	minimum	group	of	stakeholders	to	be	involved,		
																																																																																																																																																																									
Contribution	to	Sustainable	Development:	A	Review	of	the	Literature’	(2007)	84	Climatic	Change	59;	Lambert	
Schneider,	‘Is	the	CDM	Fulfilling	Its	Environmental	and	Sustainable	Development	Objective?	An	Evaluation	of	
the	CDM	and	Options	for	Improvement’	(Öko-Institut	2007)	<http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/622/2007-162-
en.pdf>	accessed	14April	2016;	Wolfgang	Sterk	and	others,	‘Further	Development	of	the	Project-Based	
Mechanisms	in	a	Post-2012	Regime’	(Wuppertal	Institute	for	Climate,	Environment	and	Energy	2009)	
<http://www.carbon-
mechanisms.de/fileadmin/media/dokumente/publikationen/cdm_post_2012_study_wi.pdf>	accessed	14	April	
2016.	
30	Böhm	and	others,	‘Greening	Capitalism?	A	Marxist	Critique	of	Carbon	Markets’		(2012)	33	Organization	
Studies	1617;	Jon	Philips	and	Peter	Newell,	‘The	governance	of	clean	energy	in	India:	The	clean	development	
mechanism	(CDM)	and	domestic	energy	politics’	(2013)	59	Energy	Policy	654.		
31	UNFCCC,	‘Appeals	mechanism,	in:	UNFCCC,	Report	of	the	Subsidiary	Body	for	Implementation	on	its	thirty-
seventh	session,	held	in	Doha	from	26	November	to	2	December	2012.	Addendum,	FCCC/SBI/2012/33/Add.1,	7	
March	2013,	pp.	4-10	(UNFCCC	2013).	
32	UNFCCC,	Climate	Change,	Carbon	Markets	and	the	CDM:	A	Call	to	Action,	Report	of	the	High-Level	Panel	on	
the	CDM	Policy	Dialogue	(UNFCCC,	Bonn	2012).	
33	Schade	and	Obergassel	(n.	10).	
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• means	for	inviting	stakeholders’	participation,		
• information	to	be	made	available	to	stakeholders	and	its	format,		
• how	consultations	shall	be	conducted,		
• how	project	participants	are	to	take	comments	into	account,		
• whether	and	how	a	second	round	of	consultations	should	be	carried	out.34		
Based	on	this	concept	note,	ninety-eight	non-governmental	networks,	organizations	and	
concerned	citizens	sent	an	open	letter	to	the	Executive	Board,	urging	the	Board	to	adopt	the	
recommendations	elaborated	by	the	Secretariat.	Furthermore,	they	urged	the	Board	to	
develop	a	work	programme	to	establish	an	independent	accountability	mechanism	and	
international	sustainable	development	criteria.	They	also	urged	that	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat	
should	be	given	a	mandate	to	engage	with	the	UN	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	on	
Human	Rights	or	special	rapporteurs	to	ensure	that	concerns	regarding	human	rights	impacts	
of	CDM	projects	are	considered	and	addressed.35	John	Knox,	UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	
Human	Rights	and	the	Environment,	similarly	wrote	a	letter	to	the	Executive	Board,	fully	
supporting	the	recommendations	made	by	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat	and	the	NGO	letter.36	
In	November	2015,	the	eighty-seventh	meeting	of	the	Board	decided	that	if	stakeholders	
submit	comments	on	human	rights	concerns	in	projects,	such	information	should	be	
forwarded	to	the	respective	national	authorities	and	to	‘relevant	bodies	within	the	United	
Nations	system’,	i.e.	UN	human	rights	bodies.37	
In	addition,	the	Board	approved	a	concept	note	on	improving	local	stakeholder	consultation	
processes.	The	Board	mandated	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat	to	draft	amendments	of	the	CDM’s	
relevant	regulatory	documents	for	the	consideration	of	the	Board	at	a	future	meeting.38	The	
Board	considered	draft	revisions	of	the	CDM	standards	at	its	ninety-second	meeting	in	
November	2016,	including	standards	for	stakeholder	consultations.	On	this	occasion	the	
Board	decided	that	the	timing	of	local	stakeholder	consultations	must	be	as	required	by	host	
country	rules,	or	before	the	start	of	the	project	if	such	rules	do	not	exist.	The	Board	also	
decided	not	to	establish	a	deregistration	process	at	this	time.	The	Secretariat	is	to	prepare	a	
further	draft	revision	of	the	CDM	standards	reflecting	these	decisions.39		
According	to	the	decision	adopted	in	November	2015,	the	scope	of	local	stakeholder	
																																																						
34	UNFCCC,‘Concept	note,	Improving	stakeholder	consultation	processes,	Version	01.0	(No.	CDM-EB86-AA-A15)‘	
(UNFCCC	2015).	
35	Open	letter	to	implement	UN	obligations	to	respect	human	rights,	9	October	2015	
<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Open-letter-to-implement-UN-obligations-to-
respect-human-rights_final_09102015.pdf>	accessed	1	September	2016.	
36	Knox,	John,	Letter	to	the	CDM	Executive	Board	<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/J.-Knox-Letter-to-CDM-Board-12-Oct-2015.pdf>	accessed	1	September	2016.	
37	UNFCCC,‘Meeting	report,	CDM	Executive	Board	eighty-seventh	meeting,	Version	01.1	(No.	CDM-EB87)‘	
(UNFCCC	2015),	para	52.	
38	ibid.,	para	51.	
39	UNFCCC,‘Meeting	report,	CDM	Executive	Board	ninety-second	meeting,	Version	01.0	(No.	CDM-EB92)‘	
(UNFCCC	2016),	para	32..	
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consultations	shall	in	future	cover	potential	direct	positive	and	negative	impacts	of	projects	
on	local	stakeholders.	As	a	minimum,	representatives	of	local	stakeholders	directly	affected	
by	the	project	and	representatives	of	local	authorities	relevant	to	the	project	shall	be	invited	
to	participate	in	the	project	planning	phase,	and	the	project	participants	need	to	provide	
evidence	that	the	respective	invitations	were	sent.	Information	should	be	disseminated	‘in	
ways	that	are	appropriate	for	the	community	that	is	directly	affected’	and	include	a	non-
technical	summary	of	the	project	and	its	alleged	positive	and	negative	impacts,	and	the	
means	to	provide	comments.40	
The	concept	note	also	envisages	that	the	project's	DOE	(i.e.	the	organisation	auditing	the	
project)	should	open	a	14-day	commenting	period	after	publication	of	the	first	monitoring	
report	to	allow	for	comments	on	impacts	triggered	by	project	implementation,	i.e.	after	
project	implementation	has	begun.	If	comments	relate	to	CDM	requirements—which	as	
already	noted	do	not	cover	human	rights	issues—these	need	to	be	resolved	before	credits	
can	be	issued.	Otherwise,	the	Board	will	forward	the	comments	to	the	host	country	
authorities.41	
It	bears	noticing	that	the	new	rules	approved	by	the	Board	are	much	less	detailed	than	the	
proposal	made	by	the	Secretariat.	Suggestions	made	by	the	Secretariat	that	are	not	included	
in	the	document	adopted	by	the	Board	include	requirements	for	project	participants	to:		
• substantiate	how	they	identified	the	local	people	affected	by	the	project,		
• invite	local	non-governmental	organisations	working	on	topics	relevant	to	the	
project,	
• use	best	practices	to	invite	stakeholders,	
• provide	a	non-technical	summary	of	the	project	in	appropriate	local	language(s);	the	
version	adopted	by	the	Board	does	not	specify	the	language(s)	to	be	used,	
• provide	management	plans	to	contain	potential	adverse	impacts,	
• conduct	an	in-person	stakeholder	meeting,	
• provide	documented	feedback	to	the	stakeholders	and	conduct	a	further	feedback	
round	if	residual	concerns	are	communicated	within	14	days.	
3.3 Observations	
Based	on	the	Ruggie	Principles,	not	only	the	host	states,	but	also	international	donors,	
financial	institutions,	credit	buyers	and	private	investors	involved	in	the	CDM	or	individual	
projects	have	a	responsibility	to	ensure	the	human	rights	compatibility	of	projects.	
Nonetheless,	human	rights	are	so	far	not	mentioned	anywhere	in	the	CDM’s	rules	and	
procedures.	The	only	potential	hooks	for	human	rights	concerns	are	the	requirement	that	
projects	should	contribute	to	sustainable	development	and	should	invite	and	duly	take	
																																																						
40	UNFCCC,	‘Improving	stakeholder	consultation	processes,	Version	01.0	(No.	CDM-EB87-A12)‘	(UNFCCC	2015)	
41	ibid.	
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account	of	stakeholder	comments.	However,	there	are	no	internationally	agreed	criteria	or	
procedures	for	assessing	CDM	projects’	contributions	to	sustainable	development,	nor	are	
there	internationally	agreed	procedures	for	conducting	local	stakeholder	consultations.	Most	
host	countries	do	not	thoroughly	investigate	projects	from	a	human	rights	perspective.	
Furthermore,	there	are	no	complaint	or	accountability	mechanisms.	Attempts	to	remedy	
these	deficits	have	been	met	with	resistance	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	impinge	on	the	
national	sovereignty	of	host	countries.		
		 In	2015,	the	Board	took	a	step	forward	by	deciding	to	forward	human	rights	concerns	
to	UN	human	rights	bodies.	However,	the	Board	still	has	no	mechanisms	of	its	own	to	
become	informed	of	such	concerns.		It	only	becomes	aware	of	human	rights	issues	when	
they	are	raised	by	non-governmental	organisations—which	usually	also	inform	the	UN	
human	rights	bodies.	The	added	value	of	this	new	approach	may	therefore	be	rather	limited.	
	 The	Board	also	decided	to	strengthen	stakeholder	consultations.	However,	the	new	
rules	approved	by	the	Board	are	yet	to	be	implemented,	and	they	are	much	less	detailed	
than	the	proposal	made	by	the	Secretariat.	Contrary	to	what	the	Secretariat	had	suggested,	
supported	by	NGOs	and	by	Special	Rapporteur	John	Knox,	the	new	rules	still	contain	no	
guidance	on	how	to	identify	the	relevant	people	affected,	no	requirement	to	provide	project	
information	in	the	appropriate	local	language(s),	no	requirement	to	provide	management	
plans	to	address	adverse	impacts,	no	requirement	to	conduct	in-person	stakeholder	
meetings	and	no	requirement	to	provide	feedback	to	stakeholders.	
	 While	undoubtedly	a	step	forward,	the	new	rules	therefore	still	do	not	solve	the	
CDM's	‘blindness’	as	regards	sustainable	development	and	human	rights	infringements	
through	CDM	projects.	That	this	can	be	a	real	issue	is	exemplified	with	three	case	examples	
we	have	assessed	in	the	course	of	our	studies.	
4	CASE	STUDIES		
4.1	The	Barro	Blanco	hydropower	project	in	Panama42	
4.1.1.	Description	of	the	CDM	project	
The	hydroelectric	power	plant	project	Barro	Blanco	was	constructed,	and	will	be	operated	
by,	Panamanian	GENISA,	specifically	founded	for	this	project.43	The	Barro	Blanco	dam	is	
located	in	the	province	of	Chiriquí	(district	of	Tolé)	in	the	immediate	proximity	to	an	Annex	
area	of	the	comarca	Ngäbe-Buglé.44	Once	finished,	it	will	have	an	installed	capacity	of	28.84	
MW.45	
	 The	estimated	project	costs	of	Barro	Blanco,	amounting	to	78,316,800	USD,	are	
financed	by	the	Deutsche	Investitions-	und	Entwicklungsgesellschaft	GmbH	(DEG),	the	
Netherlands	Development	Finance	Company	(FMO)46,	and	the	Central	American	Bank	for	
																																																						
42	The	Barro	Blanco	case	was	investigated	by	Jane	Alice	Hofbauer	and	Monika	Mayrhofer.	
43	GENISA,	‘GENISA	Project	Management	Report,	Environmental	and	Social	Summary	Report’	9.	
44	Comarcas	are	demarcated	indigenous	regions,	which	have	evolved	into	bodies	with	an	autonomous	
administration.	
45	Barro	Blanco	PDD,	‘CDM	PDD	Barro	Blanco	Version	03’.	
46	FMO/DEG	Barro	Blanco	Complaint,	‘Barro	Blanco	Complaint	-	Annex	1:	Analysis	of	Policies	and	Procedures’.	
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Economic	Integration	(CABEI)	(each	investing	approximately	25	million	USD).47	
	 The	Barro	Blanco	project	obtained	the	letter	of	approval	required	to	be	registered	as	
a	CDM	project	by	Autoridad	Nacional	del	Ambiente	(ANAM),	Panama's	then	CDM	Designated	
National	Authority	(DNA),	on	17	November	2009.48	In	June	2011,	Barro	Blanco	was	registered	
by	the	CDM	Executive	Board.49	According	to	the	validation	report	of	the	Designated	
Operational	Entity,	AENOR,	it	was	verified	during	their	visit	that	the	‘local	communities	
(Veladero,	Cerro	Viejo,	Palacios	and	Bellavista)	had	been	consulted	and	had	demonstrated	
their	support	for	the	development	of	the	Barro	Blanco	Hydroelectric	power	plant	project	by	
signing	the	corresponding	minutes	of	the	meetings’.50	In	consequence,	AENOR	stated	that	
after	speaking	to	ANAM	and	the	‘main	communities	involved	in	the	area’,	the	communities	
had	‘agreed	that	the	project	will	bring	work	and	development	to	the	area,	and	all	of	them	
supported	the	development	of	the	project’,	and	that	‘no	negative	feedback	was	received’.51	
Thus,	AENOR	concluded	that	it	could	recommend	the	Barro	Blanco	project	for	registration.		
	 A	number	of	NGO	reports	indicate	that	comments	had	been	sent	by	global	
stakeholders,	and	their	receipt	had	been	confirmed.	However,	AENOR	has	not	reflected	on	
these	comments	and	they	have	not	appeared	on	the	website	of	the	UNFCCC.52	
	 With	possibly	the	above	exception,	it	is	possible,	therefore,	to	reache	the	conclusion	
that,	from	a	CDM	perspective,	the	rules	have	been	observed,	and	that	no	major	conflicts	
arise	from	the	Barro	Blanco	project.	A	closer	inspection	of	information	on	the	case	from	
outside	the	CDM	realm,	however,	reveals	a	different	picture.	
4.1.2	The	case	
Once	completed,	the	Barro	Blanco	hydroelectric	dam	will	impact	indigenous	territory,	which	
is	protected	by	Panama’s	Constitution	as	well	as	by	Law	10	of	1997	that	establishes	the	
comarca	Ngäbe-Buglé.	Thus,	prior	to	granting	GENISA	a	concession,	the	government	of	
Panama	was	obligated	by	law	to	enter	negotiations	in	good	faith	with	the	affected	
communities	in	order	to	obtain	their	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	(FPIC).	
	 According	to	the	Panamanian	Executive	Decree	No.	123,53	a	public	forum	is	required	
as	part	of	the	impact	assessment	process.	The	Decree	states	that	the	public	forum	should	be	
																																																						
47	CABEI	replaced	the	funding	that	was	originally	sought	through	the	EIB.	The	EIB	loan	application	was	
withdrawn	by	GENISA	in	2010,	after	it	learned	that	the	EIB	planned	to	visit	the	affected	area	due	to	a	complaint	
registered	with	the	EIB	CM	(Complaint	Mechanism).	EIB	Barton,	‘Written	Questions	to	EIB	Director	Tamsyn	
Barton	-	Hearing	on	21	January	2013’;	EIB	CM,	‘Barro	Blanco	Hydroelectric	,	Panama’	
<http://www.eib.org/about/accountability/complaints/cases/barro-blanco-hydroelectric-panama.htm>	
accessed	19	May	2015.	
48	AENOR,	‘CDM	Validation	Report’	9.	
49	UNFCCC,	‘Executive	Board	of	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism.	Sixty-first	meeting.	Report	(No.	CDM-
EB61)‘	(UNFCCC	2011)	
50	AENOR	(n	44)	24.	
51	ibid	43.	
52	Osvaldo	Jordan,	Oscar	Sogandares	and	Miguel	Arjona,	‘Barro	Blanco	Hydropower	Project	in	Panama	Violates	
CDM	Rules	(Newsletter	#12)	-	Carbon	Market	Watch’	(15	February	2011)	
<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/barro-blanco-hydropower-project-in-panama-violates-cdm-rules-newsletter-
12/>	accessed	1	July	2015.	
53	Ministerio	de	Economía	y	Finanzas	de	Panama,	'Decreto	Ejecutivo	No.	123	-	Reglamenta	La	Ley	No.	41	
General	De	Ambiente,	August	14,	2009'	(Panama	2009).	
	
	 	12	
organised	by	the	project	promoter	during	the	evaluation	and	analysis	of	the	Environmental	
Impact	Analysis	(EIA),	in	order	to	provide	information	on	the	project	and	the	opportunity	for	
stakeholders	to	comment	on	the	study.	
	 GENISA	conducted	a	public	forum	in	early	2008,	as	part	of	the	EIA.54	The	forum	was	
held	at	a	location	outside	of	the	indigenous	territory	that	was	difficult	to	reach	for	the	
affected	communities	(requiring	a	several	hour	foot-march),	and	was	poorly	advertised.	As	
was	reported	in	on-site	interviews	conducted	by	the	authors,	only	a	few	members	of	the	
communities	took	part,	and	those	who	did	were	initially	restricted	from	participating	and	
only	later	allowed	in.	At	this	stage,	no	further	consultations	in	the	course	of	the	EIA	
proceedings	took	place	with	the	affected	communities.	
	 Importantly,	the	project	does	not	include	a	resettlement	plan	although	a	verification	
mission	of	the	UNDP	in	201355	found	that	the	project	would	lead	to	the	displacement	of	
several	families.56	The	project	company	has	not	reached	an	agreement	with	the	affected	
communities	to	purchase	or	lease	their	land.	The	lack	of	a	resettlement	plan	also	means	that	
no	precise	data	exists	on	the	actual	number	of	people	affected	by	the	project	and	that	
therefore	no	structured	planning	of	compensation	measures	has	taken	place.	In	April	2014,	a	
complaint	was	filed	with	the	independent	complaint	mechanism	of	the	FMO	and	DEG,	which	
released	a	report	on	the	case	in	May	2015.	The	report	of	the	FMO/DEG	complaint	
mechanism	points	out	that	the	lenders	were	not	fully	appraised	of	several	issues	including	
environmental	and	social	impacts,	indigenous	peoples,	cultural	heritage,	biodiversity	and	
ecosystem	impacts	at	the	time	of	project	approval.57	
	 Previously,	ANAM	had	temporarily	suspended	the	project	on	9	February	2015,	inter	
alia	because	an	agreement	was	not	reached	with	the	communities,	the	negotiation	process	
was	still	ongoing	and	the	National	Institute	of	Culture	(INAC)	had	not	yet	approved	an	
archaeological	management	plan	to	protect	local	archaeological	findings.58	As	of	early	2016,	
construction	of	the	dam	had	resumed	even	though	there	still	is	no	agreement	with	the	local	
communities.59	Protests	undertaken	by	the	local	population	were	still	ongoing.60	In	May	
																																																						
54	The	EIA	classified	Barro	Blanco	as	a	category	III	project,	which	can	result	in	significant	adverse	environmental	
impacts	and	calls	for	a	more	detailed	analysis.		
55	The	verification	mission	was	carried	out	as	a	result	of	a	political	dialogue	and	mediation	process	that	followed	
the	protests	and	the	blockage	of	the	Pan-American	Highway	in	2012.	The	dialogue	took	place	between	the	
affected	indigenous	communities,	the	government	and	the	project	operator	and	was	supported	by	the	Catholic	
Church	and	UNDP.	
56	López	García,	L.	(2013)	Peritaje	independiente	de	la	presa	de	Barro	Blanco,	Panamá:	informe	final	de	la	
component	de	ingeniería	hidráulica,	5	September	2013,	
http://media.gestorsutil.com/PNUD_web/651/centro_informacion_documentos/docs/0910718001378499234.
pdf	accessed	November	8,	2016.		
57	FMO/DEG	IEP,	‘Barro	Blanco	Hydroelectric	Project	Panama	-	Panel	Report	No.	1’,	paras.	50-55.	
58	ANAM,	‘ANAM	Ordena	Paralización	de	Obras	Del	Proyecto	Hidroeléctrico	Barro	Blanco	Por	Incumplimientos	
de	EIA’	(MiAmbiente,	9	February	2015)	<http://miambiente.gob.pa/index.php/homepage/ultimas-
noticias/otras-noticias/959-anam-ordena-paralizacion-de-obras-del-proyecto-hidroelectrico-barro-blanco-por-
incumplimientos-de-eia>	accessed	23	June	2015.	
59	Meanwhile	the	government	has	taken	over	negotiations	with	the	affected	communities	and	a	new	round	of	
negotiations	started	on	1	March	2016.	
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2016,	it	was	reported	that	the	floodgates	of	the	dam	were	opened.	On	9	June	2016,	the	
flooding	of	the	reservoir	was	stopped	by	the	government	after	indigenous	groups	filed	a	
criminal	suit	against	the	national	Public	Service	Authority	ASEP.61	
4.13	Observations	
The	Barro	Blanco	Case	showed	multiple	violations	of	human	rights,	even	before	the	actual	
construction	of	the	dam	itself	had	started.	The	right	to	property	and	the	right	to	housing	in	
particular,	but	also	the	right	to	health	of	the	local	population	are	affected.	The	process	of	
conducting	the	mandatory	economic	and	social	impact	report	was	flawed	and	incomplete.	
However,	these	major	deficiencies,	as	well	as	the	conflicts	with	the	local	population,	seem	to	
have	played	no	role	in	the	issuance	of	the	letter	of	approval	by	Panama's	DNA,	and	also	seem	
to	have	been	significantly	downplayed	by	the	validation	report	of	the	DOE.		
	 On	the	basis	of	the	validation	report,	the	CDM	Executive	Board	could	see	no	reason	
not	to	register	the	project.	However,	there	is	no	mechanism	to	cross-check	DOE	validations	
for	the	CDM	Executive	Board.	Also,	there	is	no	mechanism	(yet)	within	the	CDM	to	address	
complaints	of	local	stakeholders	after	project	registration.		
	 Thus,	due	to	the	lack	of	procedural	norms	within	the	CDM,	the	project	was	registered	
under	the	CDM	even	though	it	failed	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil	human	rights.		
4.2	The	Bujagali	hydropower	project	in	Uganda	
4.2.1	Description	of	the	CDM	project62	
The	Bujagali	Hydropower	Project	(BHP)	is	a	registered	CDM	project	in	Uganda.	It	is	located	on	
the	Victoria	Nile	river	in	the	Buikwe	District	in	the	Central	Region	of	Uganda	and	was	
registered	with	the	CDM	in	October	2011.63	A	capacity	of	250	MW	was	installed	by	the	end	
of	2012,	about	half	of	Uganda’s	generation	capacity.	With	total	investments	of	nearly	800	
million	USD,	the	BHP	is	one	of	the	biggest	investment	projects	in	Uganda.64	
	 The	Bujagali	dam	project	involved	two	major	phases.	A	first	attempt	under	the	lead	of	
US-based	AES	Nile	Power	(AESNP)	in	the	late	1990s	failed	inter	alia	due	to	allegations	of	
corruption	that	led	to	the	withdrawal	of	the	original	lenders,	and	to	an	unfavourable	report	
																																																																																																																																																																									
60	La	Estrella,	'Indígenas	vuelven	a	la	calle	por	Barro	Blanco'	(La	Estrella	de	Panamá,	21	January	2016)	
<http://laestrella.com.pa/panama/nacional/indigenas-vuelven-calle-barro-blanco/23917307>	accessed	April	15	
2016.	
61	Brasier,	P-J,	‘Barro	Blanco:	flooding	suspended,	international	lenders	pressured	to	act’,	14	July	2016,	
<http://carbonmarketwatch.org/barro-blanco-flooding-suspended-international-lenders-pressured-to-act/>	
accessed	September	9,	2016.	
62	The	Bujagali	case	was	investigated	by	Florian	Mersmann	and	Monika	Mayrhofer	
63	CDM,	‘Project	4217:	Bujagali	Hydropower	Project’	(UNFCCC)	<https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/ERM-
CVS1291830806.57/view>	accessed	17	May	2016.	
64	EJAtlas,	‘Bujagali	Hydropower	Project,	Uganda’	(Environmental	Justice	Atlas,	13	November	2014)	
<http://ejatlas.org/conflict/bujagali-hydropower-project-uganda>	accessed	13	November	2014;	John	Oyuke,	
‘Uganda’s	Bujagali	Power	Plant	Switched	on’	(Standard	Digital	News,	11	October	2012)	
<http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000068143/uganda-s-bujagali-power-plant-switched-on>	
accessed	27	August	2015;	UNEP	DTU,	‘UNEP	DTU	CDM/JI	Pipeline	Analysis	and	Database,	September	1st	2014’	
(2014)	<http://www.cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMPipeline.xlsm>	accessed	9	December	2014.	
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by	the	World	Bank's	Inspection	Panel	in	2001.65	AESNP	withdrew	from	the	project	in	2003,	
before	construction	started,	even	though	it	had	already	completed	economic,	social	and	
environmental	assessments	and	begun	resettlement.66	Approximately	8,700	people	were	
resettled	or	lost	assets	without	proper	compensation	upon	project	cancellation.67	
	 After	the	termination	of	the	first	project	attempt,	the	Government	of	Uganda	
instated	the	Bujagali	Implementation	Unit	(BIU)	to	manage	community	relations	with	the	
resettled	people.	However,	BIU	did	not	follow	up	on	resettlement	compensation	activities.68		
		 Finally	in	2005,	the	project	was	taken	up	again	under	a	new	company,	Bujagali	Energy	
Limited	(BEL).	In	2006,	RJ	Burnside	International	Limited	carried	out	a	Social	and	
Environmental	Assessment	(SEA)	and	a	comprehensive	Public	Consultation	and	Disclosure	
Program	(PCDP)	for	BEL,	which	entailed,	inter	alia,	meetings	with	government	agencies,	
discussions	with	NGOs,	consultations	with	local	communities,	public	meetings	and	survey	
with	affected	communities.69	
	 According	to	the	CDM	PDD	the	project	officially	started	on	21	December	2007.70	The	
CDM	PDD	itself	was	developed	in	2011.	Within	the	PDD,	BEL	gave	assurances	that	the	
company	would	take	up	responsibilities	for	those	people	affected	by	the	project	who	had	
been	displaced	in	the	course	of	the	previous	project	attempt.71	
	 The	CDM	validation	report	was	issued	in	2011	by	ERM	Certification	and	Verification	
Services,	which	acted	as	DOE	for	the	project.	It	reports	inter	alia	that	the	project	site	had	
been	assessed	and	that	follow-up	interviews	with	stakeholders	had	been	conducted.	The	
report	concludes	that	the	Bujagali	dam	‘meets	all	necessary	criteria	and	requirements	of	the	
CDM	[...].	The	DNA	of	the	host	Party	has	confirmed	that	the	project	assists	in	meeting	
sustainable	development	criteria’.72	
																																																						
65	World	Bank,	‘Uganda	-	Bujagali	Project :	Inspection	Panel	Investigation	Report’	(World	Bank	2002)	Inspection	
Panel	Report	and	Recommendations	23998	
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/05/3054709/uganda-bujagali-project-inspection-panel-
investigation-report>.	
66	World	Bank,	‘Uganda	-	Bujagali	Hydropower	Project’	(World	Bank	2005)	
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6343110/uganda-bujagali-hydropower-project>;	
Patrick	McCully,	‘International	Rivers	Comments	on	CDM	Project	Design	Document	for	Bujagali	Hydropower	
Project	(Uganda)’	(International	Rivers	2010).	
67	AfDB,	‘Independent	Review	Panel.	Compliance	Review	Report	on	the	Bujagali	Hydropower	and	
Interconnection	Projects’	(African	Development	Bank	Group	2008)	
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Compliance-Review/30740990-EN-BUJAGALI-
FINAL-REPORT-17-06-08.PDF>.	
68	ibid.	
69	R.J.	Burnside,	‘Bujagali	Energy	Limited:	Bujagali	Hydropower	Project’	(RJ	Burnside	International	Limited	2006)	
Social	and	Environmental	Assessment	–	Main	Report	I-A	10045.	
70	CDM,	‘Project	Design	Document:	Bujagali	Hydropower	Project’	
(UNFCCC).<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/8/F/Z/8FZCNYUT9JB5AO6SM0KXR73QGEHIPV/PDD_form05-
Bujagali%20V2.1%205March2014_clean.pdf?t=NVJ8bzVvYnpqfDB9_CD5Xoq7GeqVwYmmnBQf>	accessed	15	
April	2016.	
71	The	PDD	was	revised	in	2014	in	order	to	account	for	slightly	higher	generation	values	than	originally	
expected.	Otherwise,	it	remains	unchanged.	
72	ERM	Certification	and	Verification	Services,	‘CDM	Validation	Report‘	(ERM	CVS	2011).	
<https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/H/A/0/HA0MN2GWX18YJE4IC93R56UFPZ7QDT/1883%20v1%20Bujagali%2
0FVR%2006Oct2011signed.pdf?t=eTN8bzVvYnA3fDDPNOfr9Q5mIaCRkUnQ1jk7>	accessed	15	April	2016.	
	
	 	15	
	 Again,	judging	from	official	CDM	documentation,	the	project	seems	to	meet	high	
standards,	and	no	major	infringements	upon	human	rights	should	be	expected.	In	practice,	
the	project	caused	a	significant	number	of	human	rights	violations.		
4.2.2	The	case	
Right	from	the	preparatory	phase	of	the	project,	the	BHP	faced	opposition	from	local	groups	
and	environmental	justice	organisations.	Complaints	centred	on	the	alleged	inadequacy	of	
the	consultation	and	resettlement	process	and	the	lack	of	adequate	compensation	for	the	
affected	people	who	claimed	to	have	lost	their	livelihoods.	Among	other	complaints,	the	
resettlement	site	was	deemed	inadequate	in	its	location	and	inferior	to	the	original	
settlement;	houses	and	services	(water,	electricity,	education)	were	unfinished.	The	resettled	
people	did	not	have	an	adequate	voice	in	the	choice	of	the	resettlement	site.	Because	of	the	
location	far	from	the	river,	the	people's	main	occupation	of	fishing	could	not	be	upheld,	and	
many	occupants	fell	into	unemployment,	leading	to	their	inability	to	pay	for	school	fees.73	
	 According	to	the	CDM	PDD,	the	consultation	process	with	the	local	communities	
continued	during	the	construction	and	operation	of	the	dam.	BEL	worked	with	a	witness	
NGO,	InterAid	Africa,	in	order	to	address	grievances	from	affected	persons.74	From	
interviews	that	the	authors	of	this	present	article	conducted	with	the	local	population	it	
became	clear	that,	instead	of	relying	on	the	grievance	mechanism	of	the	project	
implementer,	affected	people	turned	to	other	NGOs	to	represent	them.	These	NGOs	then	
turned	to	the	grievance	mechanisms	of	the	multilateral	banks	that	acted	as	lenders	for	the	
project.	
	 In	2006,	after	a	fact-finding	mission,	the	AfDB’s	Compliance	Review	and	Mediation	
Unit	(CRMU)	recommended	the	AfDB	Group’s	Boards	of	Directors	to	conduct	a	compliance	
review.	The	review	concluded	that	the	BIP	had	not	complied	with,	inter	alia,	the	
requirements	of	the	Bank	Policies	on	Involuntary	Resettlement,	Gender	and	Poverty	
Reduction,	nor	with	environmental	policies	and	guidelines.75	
	 In	2007,	complaints	were	also	filed	with	the	World	Bank's	Inspection	Panel.	The	
Inspection	Panel	found	that	the	project	violated	World	Bank	policies	on	environmental,	
hydrological,	social,	cultural,	economic,	and	financial	issues.	The	Panel	further	criticized	the	
project,	stating	that	‘the	Project	did	not	comply	with	the	mandate	of	[World]	Bank	policy	to	
improve	or	at	least	restore,	in	real	terms,	the	livelihoods	and	standards	of	living	of	the	
people	displaced	by	the	Project’.76	
	 In	response	to	the	Inspection	Panel's	critique,	the	project	management	developed	an	
action	plan	(MAP,	latest	progress	report	in	2013)	to	alleviate	the	shortcomings	of	the	project.	
The	action	plan	included	improvements	in	institutional	capacity,	increased	guidance	on	social	
safeguard	issues,	social	impact	assessments,	and	sharing	of	project	benefits	with	affected	
																																																						
73	EJAtlas	(n	58);	AfDB	(n	61).	
74	Bujagali	PDD	(n	64).	
75	ibid;	AfDB	(n	61).	
76	World	Bank,	‘Management	Report	and	Recommendation	in	Response	to	the	Inspection	Panel	Investigation	
Report	No.	44977-Ug	of	the	Uganda:	Private	Power	Generation	(Bujagali)	Project’	(2008)	IDA/R2008-0296.	
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people.77	
	 The	interviewees	regarded	the	redress	mechanisms	as	effective	and	responsive	to	
their	complaints.	The	management	plans	set	up	by	ADB	and	World	Bank/IFC	in	response	to	
the	reports	by	the	redress	mechanisms	were	regarded	by	most	interviewees	as	pivotal	in	
righting	the	situation	for	the	affected	people.	In	fact,	interviewees	overwhelmingly	pointed	
to	the	MDBs,	especially	to	the	World	Bank	Inspection	Panel,	as	the	most	reliable	reference	
for	hearing	complaints	and	righting	failures.	
4.2.3	Observations	
Bujagali	is	a	complicated	case	because	of	its	two	consecutive	implementation	phases,	which	
muddled	reponsibilities	and	left	affected	people	in	limbo.	Within	the	CDM	realm,	the	project	
complied	with	all	requirements,	but,	again,	in	the	absence	of	clear	rules	of	conduct,	it	was	up	
to	the	host	country	to	enforce	any	rules	and	laws	a	project	needs	to	comply	with.	Such	
enforcement	by	the	host	country	does	not	seem	to	have	taken	place	in	Bujagali.	The	case,	
however,	shows	how	important	clear	procedural	norms,	and	especially	grievance	
mechanisms,	can	be	in	order	to	address	human	rights	infringements	caused	by	a	project	such	
as	Bujagali.		
	 The	presence	of	international	lenders	seems	to	have	been	highly	important	in	order	
to	settle	the	multiple	claims	of	infringements	of	human	rights,	which	among	others	included	
right	to	housing,	right	to	food,	right	to	health	and	right	to	property.	While	the	
recommendations	by	the	non-judicial	grievance	mechanisms	of	the	multilateral	banks	are	
non-obligatory,	they	create	pressure	on	the	implementers	to	alleviate	identified	grievances	
of	project-affected	people.	
4.3	The	Olkaria	geothermal	project	in	Kenya	
4.3.1	Description	of	the	CDM	project78	
The	Olkaria	IV	geothermal	power	plant	is	located	in	Kenya’s	share	of	the	African	Rift	close	to	
Lake	Naivasha	and	adjacent	to	the	Hell’s	Gate	National	Park.	Olkaria	IV	is	operated	by	the	
parastatal	Kenya	Electricity	Generating	Company	(KenGen).	The	project	was	approved	by	the	
Kenyan	DNA	in	July	2012;	the	final	PDD	was	completed	in	November	2012	and	the	validation	
report	by	the	DOE	followed	shortly	after.	In	December	2012,	the	DOE	submitted	its	CDM	
registration	request	form;	registration	was	then	enacted	in	June	2013	and	antedated	to	
December	28,	2012.79		
	 The	project	is	part	of	the	larger	Kenya	Electricity	Expansion	Project	(KEEP)	of	the	
World	Bank.	It	is	funded	by	five	main	lending	institutions	(the	World	Bank's	International	
																																																						
77	World	Bank,	‘Uganda	-	Private	Power	Generation	(Bujagali)	Project :	Fourth	Progress	Report	on	
Implementation	of	Management’	(The	World	Bank	2013)	82625	
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/02/18510512/uganda-private-power-generation-bujagali-
project-fourth-progress-report-implementation-managements-action-plan-response-inspection-panel-
investigation-report-uganda-private-power-generation-bujagali-project-fourth-progress-report-
implementation-management>	accessed	4	February	2016.	
78	The	Olkaria	case	was	investigated	by		Jeanette	Schade	and	Jane	Alice	Hofbauer.	
79	CDM,	‘Project	8646:	Olkaria	Geothermal	Project’	
(UNFCCC)<http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/JCI1355128868.24/view>accessed	17	May	2016.	
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Development	Agency	IDA,	the	European	Investment	Bank	EIB,	the	French	Development	
Agency	AFD,	the	German	Development	Bank	KfW,	and	the	Japanese	International	
Cooperation	Agency	JICA)—by	investments	amounting	to	roughly	1.4	billion	USD	in	total.80	
		 Lenders	agreed	that	the	involuntary	resettlement	necessary	for	the	project	would	be	
carried	out	according	to	Operational	Policy	4.12	of	the	World	Bank.	Three	Maasai	villages	
had	to	be	resettled	to	vacate	the	land	for	Olkaria	IV.81	A	fourth	one	had	to	be	resettled	
because	of	the	projected	air	pollution.82	KenGen	contracted	a	consultant	firm,	GIBB	Africa,	to	
elaborate	a	Resettlement	Action	Plan	(RAP).		
	 The	CDM	PDD	for	Olkaria	IV	mentions	the	existence	of	a	land	dispute	between	the	
Maasai	and	Kedong	Ranch	Ltd.	concerning	the	land	required	for	the	project,	the	claim	to	be	
considered	in	job	offerings,	and	claims	for	compensation.83	KenGen’s	response	in	the	PDD	is	
that	relocations	will	be	organised	according	to	approved	standards,	that	funds	are	provided	
for	community	projects,	and	that	Maasai	applications	for	jobs	will	be	considered	in	case	of	
appropriate	skills.	However,	appropriate	job	training	for	the	mainly	unskilled,	semi-nomadic	
pastoralist	Maasai	are	not	mentioned.84	
		 The	local	stakeholder	consultation	for	the	CDM	project's	validation	was	carried	out	in	
March	2012	by	the	DOE	Japan	Consulting	Institute	(JCI).	The	DOE	concludes	in	its	summary	of	
the	public	consultation	process	that	‘[a]	good	number	(99%)	of	the	respondents	admitted	
that	they	were	aware	of	the	project	[…]’85	which	is	not	surprising	because	resettlement	
planning	has	taken	place	since	2009.	
	 As	the	DOE	received,	in	its	view,	no	major	objections	against	the	project,	the	
consultation	process	raised	no	obstacle	to	the	CDM	project	registration.	Therefore	the	DOE	
issued	a	positive	validation	report.86	Within	the	limits	of	the	CDM	registration	process,	all	
formal	obligations	have	been	observed.	
4.3.2	The	case	
The	community	members	of	the	four	villages,	all	Maasai,	have	been	resettled	as	one	group.	
The	new	settlement	site	was	agreed	to	provide	for	modern	houses,	modern	infrastructure	
																																																						
80	World	Bank,	‘Kenya	-	Electricity	Expansion	Project	(English)	-	Integrated	Safeguards	Data	Sheet’	(2010)	
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IV	Power	Station’	(2011)	<http://www-
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82	Mwangi-Gachau	E,	‘Resettlement	of	Project	Affected	Persons:	A	Case	of	Olkaria	IV	(Domes)	Geothermal	
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84	Ibid.	
85	ibid.	
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(roads,	electricity	and	water	pipes),	social	services	(school	and	health	centre),	and	additional	
land	for	pasturing	of	the	cattle	at	the	site.	The	total	area	for	compensation	of	land	was	
agreed	upon	as	1,700	acres	over	which	the	project	affected	persons	(PAPs)	are	supposed	to	
get	their	own	title	deeds.	Resettlement	planning	was	carried	out	by	the	Resettlement	Action	
Plan	Implementing	Committee	(RAPIC),	which	included	representatives	from	all	affected	
communities,	local	administration,	athe	operator—and	in	2012	an	operational-level	
grievance	mechanism	was	established.87	
	 However,	when	resettlement	was	effected	in	August	2014,	complaints	were	
submitted	immediately	to	the	World	Bank	Inspection	Panel	and	the	EIB	Complaint	
Mechanism	(EIB-CM),	which	in	late	2014	started	to	investigate	the	project.		
	 Main	points	raised	by	the	complaining	community	members	have	been:	flaws	of	the	
census	and	lack	of	houses,	the	quality	of	land,	lack	of	title	deeds,	large	distances	from	
previous	sources	of	livelihoods,	use	of	compensation	funds	to	pay	for	access	to	the	electricity	
grid,	shortcomings	in	livelihood	restoration—in	particular	with	respect	to	the	Cultural	Centre	
(one	of	the	villages)—by	not	taking	into	account	that	tourism	is	its	unique	source	of	
livelihood	(not	pastoralism),88	incidents	of	intimidation	and	exclusion	of	(outspoken)	
community	representatives	in	RAPIC,	and	lack	of	trust	in	RAPIC	and	its	grievance	mechanism.	
The	majority	of	these	complaints	had	already	been	an	issue	before	the	physical	move.89	
	 The	investigating	bodies	of	the	banks	largely	confirmed	the	allegations	of	the	
complainants,	and	in	addition	found	that	donors	did	not	apply	the	World	Bank’s	Operational	
Policy	4.10	on	indigenous	peoples,	that	the	World	Bank	insufficiently	monitored	the	
resettlement,	and	that	the	Mutual	Reliance	Initiative	(MRI),	a	joint	co-financing	mechanism	
of	the	European	lenders,	to	some	extent	prevented	EIB	from	complying	with	its	due	
diligence.90	
4.3.3	Observations	
The	documentation	of	the	local	stakeholder	consultation	process	is	not	included	in	the	PDD,	
but	in	interviews	conducted	within	the	case	study	affected	people	confirmed	that	they	had	
attended	the	meeting.	It	seems,	however,	that	they	are	not	aware	what	the	CDM	is	about,	
nor	of	the	political	meaning	of	their	participation	in	the	consultation.	
	 While	the	investigations	conducted	by	the	World	Bank	Inspection	Panel	and	the	EIB-
CM	found	a	number	of	significant	flaws,	not	least	concerning	the	consultation	and	
participation	of	project-affected	persons,	the	CDM	Executive	Board	remained	uninformed	of	
the	controversies.	Since	at	the	time	of	registration	no	possibility	of	a	complaints	review	post-
registration	existed	within	the	CDM,	any	righting	of	grievances	has	had	to	fall	back	on	other	
structures,	as	provided	by	the	multilateral	development	banks.	
																																																						
87	GIBB,	Resettlement	Action	Plan	(n	70)	
88	It	should	be	noted	that	different	PAPs	profit	or	suffer	to	different	degrees	from	the	relocation	and	that	inter-
community	divisions	and	power	imbalances	exist.		
89	For	further	details	see	Jeanette	Schade	‘EU	accountability	for	the	due	diligence	failures	of	the	European	
Investment	Bank:	Climate	finance	and	involuntary	resettlement	in	Olkaria,	Kenya’	in	this	Special	Issue.	
90	World	Bank	Inspection	Panel,	'KENYA	Electricity	Expansion	Project	(P103037)	-	Investigation	Report	July	2,	
2015'	(World	Bank	2015)	<http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/97-
Inspection%20Panel%20Investigation%20Report.pdf>	accessed	17	May	2016;	EIB	Complaints	Mechanism,	
'Conclusions	Report.	Olkaria	I	and	IV,	Kenya,	Complaint	SG/E/2014/07	and	SG/E/2014/08'	(2015).	
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5	CONCLUDING	REFLECTIONS		
5.1	Human	rights	infringements	and	CDM	deficiencies	
Based	on	the	Ruggie	Principles,	not	only	host	states,	but	also	international	donors,	financial	
institutions,	credit	buyers	and	private	investors	involved	in	the	CDM	or	individual	projects	
have	a	responsibility	to	ensure	human	rights	compatibility	of	projects.	Nonetheless,	human	
rights	are	thus	far	not	mentioned	anywhere	in	the	CDM’s	rules	and	procedures—ensuring	
projects’	contribution	to	sustainable	development	and	adequate	stakeholder	consultations	is	
left	to	each	host	country	individually.	Previous	research	has	concluded	that	many	host	
countries	do	not	thoroughly	investigate	projects	and	that	stakeholder	consultations	are	often	
deficient.	Furthermore,	there	are	no	complaint	or	accountability	mechanisms.		
	 These	points	are	borne	out	by	the	cases	discussed	in	this	article.	All	three	cases	
involve	conflicts	around	resettlement	and	the	consequent	impairment	of	livelihoods	as	well	
as	deficiencies	in	stakeholder	consultations	and	impact	assessments.	Based	on	the	rights	to	
property	and	security	of	tenure	as	spelled	out	by	Article	17	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	
Human	Rights,	and	elaborated	upon	in	the	Guiding	Principles	on	Internal	Displacement,	
involuntary	displacement	and	resettlement	can	only	be	justified	by	a	compelling	and	
overriding	public	interest.	The	decision	concerning	whether	there	is	a	compelling	public	
interest	is	linked	inter	alia	to	the	obligation	of	conducting	a	prior	environmental	impact	
assessment.	Those	assessments	were	deficient	in	all	three	cases,	which	led	to	deficient	
implementation	and	also	leaves	a	question	mark	over	whether	the	resettlements	were	
actually	justified.	
	 In	the	Barro	Blanco	case,	the	violation	of	state	responsibility	relates	in	particular	to	
the	failure	to	obtain	the	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	of	the	affected	indigenous	
communities.	Closely	connected	to	this	issue	is	the	problem	of	a	faulty	environmental	and	
social	impact	assessment,	which	erroneously	concluded	that	the	project	would	not	involve	
displacements.	In	addition,	even	though	this	initial	assumption	was	disproved,	there	is	still	
no	resettlement	plan	yet,	no	precise	data	on	the	full	range	of	people	affected	by	the	project	
and	to	date,	no	structured	planning	of	compensation	measures.		
	 In	the	Bujagali	case,	the	grievance	mechanisms	of	the	three	MDBs	involved	concluded	
that	the	initial	socio-economic	survey	had	been	faulty.	Moreover,	the	project	failed	to	at	
least	restore	the	livelihoods	and	standards	of	living	of	the	people	displaced	by	the	project,	in	
particular	during	the	hiatus	period,	when	responsibility	for	the	project	lay	solely	with	the	
government	of	Uganda.	While	deficiencies	have	been	remedied	since,	in	the	interim	the	
PAPs	experienced	a	severely	diminished	standard	of	living.	On	the	positive	side,	the	MDB	
grievance	mechanisms	proved	effective.	The	case	thus	demonstrates	that	social	safeguard	
policies,	expressed	through	procedural	norms	(in	this	case	of	the	MDBs)	can	prove	effective	
to	safeguard	against,	or	at	least	remedy,	infringements	on	human	rights.		
	 The	Olkaria	case	shows	a	similar	picture	with	weaknesses	in	the	impact	assessment	
and	stakeholder	consultations.	The	census,	providing	the	basis	for	any	compensation	
entitlements,	was	methodologically	flawed,	which	resulted	in	continuous	complaints.	
Furthermore,	the	consultation	process	was	accompanied	by	struggles	over	land	rights	and	
distrust	in	the	project’s	mechanisms	for	participation.	
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Finally,	all	three	cases	highlight	the	CDM’s	limitations	in	terms	of	ensuring	accuracy	and	
accountability:	
• The	documentation	of	the	Barro	Blanco	project	claims	that	local	communities	have	been	
consulted	and	have	demonstrated	their	support	for	the	project	even	though	evidence	
points	to	the	contrary;		
• The	documentation	of	the	Bujagali	project	mentions	that	there	was	resettlement	in	the	
first	project	phase	but	makes	no	mention	of	the	associated	problems;	
• The	documentation	of	the	Olkaria	project	mentions	the	land	dispute	and	asserts	that	all	
problems	will	be	resolved.	However,	this	has	not	been	the	case.	Moreover,	many	
problems	arose	only	during	project	implementation,	but	the	CDM	has	no	procedures	for	
re-opening	cases.		
5.2	Ways	forward	
The	Paris	Agreement	opens	a	new	page	for	international	climate	policy.	The	
acknowledgement	of	human	rights	as	an	integral	part	of	decisions	on	climate	action	in	the	
preamble	of	the	agreement	provides	an	opportunity	to	better	integrate	safeguards	into	the	
Agreement’s	mechanisms.	
	 While	the	CDM	is	likely	to	expire	with	the	ending	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	second	
commitment	period	in	2020,	the	Paris	Agreement	establishes	a	new	mechanism—the	rules	
for	which	are	to	be	developed	on	the	basis	of	experience	gained	from	existing	mechanism.	
This	should	include	the	experience	gained	with	the	human	rights	issues	caused	by	the	CDM’s	
lack	of	standards.	
	 This	article	has	deliberately	focused	on	projects	with	negative	media	coverage	in	
order	to	analyse	human	rights	concerns	and	extraterritorial	obligations	as	deeply	as	possible.	
Some	authors	see	the	fundamental	orientation	of	carbon	markets	such	as	the	CDM	as	being	
inherently	geared	towards	exacerbating	pre-existing	inequalities.	The	CDM	allows	emitters	in	
the	‘Global	North’	to	shift	the	cost	of	emission	reductions	to	the	‘Global	South’.	This	shift	
necessarily	appropriates	local	productive	resources,	impairing	local	livelihoods.91	Even	if	
projects	are	run	by	well-intentioned	developers—in	the	main	‘carbon	comes	first’	rather	
than	local	development	needs	since	without	emission	reductions	there	will	be	no	carbon	
finance.92		Bryant	et	al.	even	suggest	that	the	generation	of	inexpensive	emission	credits,	the	
core	rationale	of	the	CDM,	crucially	hinges	on	weak	social	and	environmental	regulation	at	
the	project	level.93	However,	other	research	has	identified	CDM	projects	with	positive	
impacts	on	local	livelihoods.94	So	how	to	explain	such	differences	in	outcome?		
		 The	contribution	to	sustainable	development	(or	lack	thereof)	depends	in	each	case	
upon	national	and	institutional	priorities,	market	demands	and	the	involvement	of	
																																																						
91	Bachram	(n.	5);	Böhm	and	others	(n.	30).	
92	Adam	Bumpus,	Realizing	Local	Development	in	the	Carbon	Commodity	Chain	Political	Economy,	Value	and	
Connecting	Carbon	Commodities	at	Multiple	Scales	(United	Nations	Research	Institute	for	Social	Development,	
Geneva	2011).	
93	Gareth	Bryant	and	others,	‘‘Fixing’	the	climate	crisis:	capital,	states,	and	carbon	offsetting	in	India’	(2015)	47	
Environment	and	Planning	A.	
94	Boyd	and	others	(n.	29);	Bumpus	(n.	92);	Sterk	and	others	(n.	29).	
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stakeholders	at	multiple	levels.95	Given	the	absence	of	international	governance	for	
sustainable	development	in	the	CDM,	national	governance	is	key.	Responsibility	for	the	
deficiencies	in	the	three	projects	analysed	here	to	a	large	extent	lies	with	the	host	countries:	
failing	to	obtain	FPIC	in	the	Barro	Blanco	case,	failing	to	provide	for	resettled	communities	in	
the	Bujagali	case,	and	failing	to	organise	orderly	resettlement	in	the	Olkaria	case.	
	 In	the	literature,	Peru	is	frequently	held	up	as	a	positive	counter-example.	Instead	of	
relying	on	desk	reviews	as	do	many	other	countries’	DNAs,	the	Peruvian	DNA	conducts	site	
visits	and	consults	with	the	local	population	on	their	needs	and	possible	contributions	to	the	
project.	Moreover,	Peru	requires	sustainable	development	benefits	to	be	included	in	the	
projects’	monitoring	plans.	As	consequence,	Peruvian	projects	are	found	to	have	a	high	
incidence	of	sustainable	development	benefits.96	
	 However,	since	regulation	in	other	countries	has	been	lacking,	international	
regulation	seems	called	for.	Based	on	the	experience	gained	in	the	CDM,	one	can	conclude	
that	all	states	that	are	parties	to	relevant	human	rights	treaties	have	a	responsibility	to	
support	proposals	within	the	UNFCCC	to	improve	the	human	rights	compatibility	of	climate	
mechanisms.	In	reference	to	the	Ruggie	Principles,	Parties	to	the	UNFCCC	should	thus	ensure	
that	the	mechanisms	within	the	UNFCCC	require	all	projects	to	undergo	a	human	rights	
impact	assessment	(HRIA)	with	clear	procedural	requirements	for	stakeholder	consultations.	
Application	of	standards	should	not	be	left	to	the	fortuitous	involvement	of	donors	such	as	
the	multilateral	banks.	Projects	that	do	not	comply	with	the	requirements	should	be	deemed	
ineligible	for	registration.	Moreover,	projects	should	be	required	to	monitor	socio-economic	
impacts	throughout	their	lifetime.	To	operationalize	these	requirements,	DOEs	should	be	
given	a	mandate	to	assess	compliance	before	and	throughout	project	implementation.		
	 Mandatory	human	rights	standards	would	help	empower	local	communities	to	
influence	project	designs	according	to	their	needs.	At	a	minimum,	mandatory	standards	
would	prevent	the	new	mechanism	from	providing	resources	to	projects	that	involve	human	
rights	violations.		
	 The	UNFCCC	should	follow	best	practice	of	international	organisations,	notably	the	
development	banks,	and	establish	an	institutional	grievance	mechanism	at	the	international	
level	to	address	failures	of	the	mechanism’s	governing	body	to	adhere	to	standards.	In	
addition,	the	UNFCCC	should	require	the	establishment	of	a	project-level	grievance	
mechanism	if	a	project	is	deemed	to	have	a	significant	adverse	impact	on	communities	
and/or	the	environment.	Grievance	mechanisms	at	the	operational	level	should	at	a	
minimum	comply	with	the	Ruggie	Principles	and	applied	procedural	requirements	should	
include	the	right	to	access	to	redress	(complaints	mechanisms).	Finally,	there	should	be	
procedures	to	allow	the	de-registering	of	projects	if	human	rights	violations	are	revealed	
after	registration	and	are	not	satisfactorily	addressed.		
	 The	introduction	of	mandatory	human	rights	safeguards	would	significantly	increase	
transaction	costs.	As	the	core	objective	of	the	CDM	is	to	generate	inexpensive	emission	
reductions,	Bryant	et	al.	suggest	that	there	may	be	significant	political–economic	limitations	
																																																						
95	Adam	Bumpus	and	John	Cole,	‘How	can	the	current	CDM	deliver	sustainable	development?’	(2010)	1	WIREs	
Climate	Change	541.	
96	Boyd	and	others	(n.	29);	Bumpus	and	Cole	(n.	95).	
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to	the	potential	for	reforming	the	CDM	without	undermining	the	very	rationale	of	the	
instrument.97	However,	an	empirical	study	of	CDM	Gold	Standard	projects—projects	with	a	
voluntary	label	that	includes	social	and	environmental	criteria	as	well	as	mandatory	
procedures	for	how	to	conduct	local	stakeholder	consultations—reveals	that	project	
developers	generally	deem	the	requirements	to	be	manageable	with	a	reasonable	amount	of	
additional	work.98	From	a	human	rights	viewpoint,	there	is	in	any	case	no	excuse	for	making	
the	most	vulnerable	groups	bear	the	social	costs	of	mitigation.99	
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